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Public Technological Aid to Support Compliance to
Environmental Standards1
John K. Stranlund
Department of Resource Economics, Uni¨ersity of Massachusetts}Amherst,
Amherst, Massachusetts 01003
Received April 16, 1996; revised November 1, 1997
Public aid to encourage the adoption of superior emissions-control technologies is com-bined
with monitoring to achieve a predetermined level of compliance to firm-specific abatement
standards. Technological aid serves as an indirect enforcement tool in the sense that its provision
reduces the direct enforcement effort necessary to reach the compliance goal. Furthermore, when
direct enforcement effort and technological aid are combined to minimize the costs of reaching the
compliance goal, more aid should be provided when direct enforcement effort is expensive. As a
consequence, regulated firms adopt better control technologies, which, in turn, may serve to promote
further innovative activity. Q 1997 Aca-demic Press

1. INTRODUCTION
It is widely accepted that the development and diffusion of advanced pollutioncontrol technologies is an important determinant of progress toward achieving
environmental quality goals. In fact, a number of policies have been designed, at
least in part, to promote the adoption of advanced control technologies. Typically
such policies offer various forms of public aid that reduce the costs of adopting
more effective technologies. For example, the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency’s 33r50 Program seeks to reduce the emissions of toxic pollutants of
participating firms by gathering and disseminating information about advanced
control technologies and by providing technical assistance w18x. Similarly, the EPA’s
Green Lights Program is designed to help firms adopt more efficient lighting
systems by providing information about advanced lighting systems, technical support, and information about financing the purchase of new lighting systems w19x.2
One reason that policymakers may want to pursue such policies is that the
widespread adoption of more effective control technologies decreases aggregate
emissions-control costs, thereby making environmental regulation more palatable.
Furthermore, the pace of technological advance in pollution control is likely to be
1
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Participation in these programs is voluntary; consequently, analyses of the programs have focused
on the determination of the characteristics of firms that influence voluntary participation. For examples,
see DeCanio w4x and Arora and Cason w2x.

positively related to the quality of control technologies in actual use. Because of
learning-by-doing and learning-by-using, the adoption and operation of new technologies invariably generates new knowledge and new skills, which, in turn, tend to
support further innovative activity Žfor a thorough discussion of these issues and
others related to technological advance, see Dosi w5x.. This paper explores a third
benefit of technological aid that has been overlooked: namely, we shall consider
whether public efforts to promote the adoption of advanced control technologies
may also serve to support efforts to maintain compliance to environmental controls.
To explore the notion of technological aid as an indirect enforcement mechanism, we shall consider a regulatory environment in which heterogeneous firms
face firm-specific abatement standards, a penalty schedule for noncompliance, and
firm-specific audit probabilities. In this setting, each firm chooses a pollution
control technology and the degree to which it is compliant. As is most common in
the literature, we shall assume that the penalty schedule is beyond the regulator’s
influence, so its enforcement effort is limited to choosing the probability with
which a firm is to be audited. Before the firms make their choices, the regulator,
taking the abatement standards as given, commits to a monitoring program and a
level of technological aid to achieve a predetermined level of compliance by each
firm in a cost-effective manner.
Like the actual policies described above, technological aid in this paper is
modeled as a cost-reducing, public input into the production of environmental
quality Žemissions control.. More specifically, it is a nonexcludable public investment that is meant to promote the adoption of advanced control technologies by
reducing the firms’ costs of adopting these technologies. Such investments may
include public research and development of new technologies, collecting and
disseminating information about new technologies, and providing direct technical
support to help firms choose, install, and maintain new control technologies.
The primary results of the analysis reveal that these sorts of aid instruments are
substitutes for direct enforcement activities. We shall see that the amount of
enforcement effort required to bring a firm to a certain level of compliance
decreases with the provision of aid; thus, technological aid may be used to support
a compliance goal by reducing the burden on direct enforcement efforts. Furthermore, when the provision of aid is a worthwhile investment Žan issue that we shall
address., the optimal choice of aid is increasing with the cost of conducting an
audit of a firm’s emissions. Thus when monitoring is difficult because the sources
of pollution are widely dispersed or because emissions are not measured easily as
in nonpoint pollution problems, regulators should be motivated to consider substituting technological aid for direct enforcement. Furthermore, there is a potentially
important by-product of this relationship. The greater reliance on technological aid
that is called for when enforcement is expensive induces firms to adopt more
effective control technologies. If it is true that there is a positive relationship
between the quality of technologies in use and the pace of technological change in
pollution control, then those situations in which enforcement is difficult may
ultimately result in quicker innovations than when enforcement is relatively easy.
This paper draws from and contributes to the theoretical literature concerning
the enforcement of environmental policies Žfor examples, see Keeler w10x, Malik

w13x, and Garvie and Keeler w6x..3 In fact, the treatment of regulated firms in this
paper is typical of what one finds in this literature, except that their choices of
control technologies are modeled explicitly. The most important extension, however, is that we shall endow an environmental authority with the ability to use
technological aid to manipulate these technology choices to help maintain compliance to an emissions-control policy. Perhaps the most closely related work is
Stranlund’s w17x welfare comparison of a regime of mandatory compliance to an
environmental standard that is supported by penalties for noncompliance to a
regime of voluntary compliance supported by unspecified public efforts to reduce
the costs of compliance. Because the two regimes were analyzed in isolation and
then compared, the substitution possibilities between direct enforcement and
compliance cost-reducing public efforts were not examined. In the current paper,
direct enforcement and a specific public investment Ži.e., technological aid. are
combined into a coherent policy to focus on the substitution possibilities between
the two activities.
This paper also contributes to the literature on technological advance in pollution control. Much of this literature focuses on the incentives firms have to adopt a
new control technology under the usual control options: emissions standards, fees,
and transferable permits.4 ŽSee Milliman and Prince w14x and Jung, Krutilla, and
Boyd w9x for good examples of this literature, and Kemp w11x for a comprehensive
literature review.. None, however, allows the possibility that firms may be noncompliant, and it is not common in this literature to consider public efforts to promote
the adoption of cleaner technologies. An exemption is Carraro and Soubeyran w3x,
who ask whether it is better to tax emissions or to subsidize the adoption of a
cleaner production technology. As is common practice, they assumed perfect
compliance under the emissions tax policy. It is also important to note the different
instruments that are used to promote the adoption of more effective technologies.
We will not consider a subsidy, but instead will focus on the public provision of
nonexcludable goods that reduce the firms’ costs of adopting more effective control
technologies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The first part of Section 2
examines a firm’s choices of technology and compliance when it is provided a
certain amount of technological aid. Although the regulator’s goal is to combine
technological aid and monitoring to achieve a predetermined compliance goal in a
cost-effective manner, it is convenient and informative to break this problem into
parts. Consequently, the second half of Section 2 specifies the monitoring necessary for the regulator to reach its compliance goal given some arbitrary level of aid.
Armed with the firms’ optimal choices and the specification of the required
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In this paper we shall restrict the analysis of technological aid and enforcement to the case of
emissions standards and leave the extension to emissions taxes and transferable permits for the future.

monitoring strategy, in Section 3 we shall examine the provision of aid that
minimizes the aggregate costs of achieving the compliance goal. Section 4 concludes.

2. COMPLIANCE, MONITORING, AND TECHNOLOGICAL AID
2.1. Technological Aid and Firm Choices
Consider a set N s Ž1, . . . , n. of heterogeneous, risk-neutral firms, each of which
chooses a level of abatement a i and a pollution control technology z i to minimize
its costs under a regulatory regime consisting of abatement standards and an
enforcement mechanism. Let a firm i’s abatement cost function be ¨ i Ž a i, z i ., which
is increasing in a i Ž ¨ ai ) 0; throughout, subscripts denote derivatives in the usual
fashion.. Define e0i to be i’s emissions in an unregulated setting. Then, a i is an
element of the closed interval w0, e0i x. The value of z i is taken from a positive index
of pollution control technologies that is assumed to be continuous for analytic
convenience. The index orders the technologies according to their effectiveness in
reducing the firm’s abatement cost so that ¨ i Ž a i, z i . is decreasing in z i w ¨ zi - 0x.
Technologies that take on higher values of z i are said to be superior to those that
take on lower values of z i. Assume that marginal abatement cost is also decreasing
in superior control technologies w ¨ ai z - 0x. In addition, ¨ i Ž a i, z i . is strictly convex
i
i .Ž i .
w ¨ aa
) 0, ¨ zi z ) 0, and Ž ¨ aa
¨ z z y Ž ¨ ai z . 2 ) 0x, and, to simplify the analysis, suppose that all the third derivatives of ¨ i Ž a i, z i . are zero.
The cost of adopting a control technology is w i Ž z i, q ., which is increasing in
superior technologies w wzi ) 0x. A regulator seeks to promote the adoption of
superior control technologies by providing technological aid q that reduces the
firm’s total and marginal costs of adopting superior technologies w wqi - 0 and
wzi q - 0x. Assume that w i Ž z i, q . is strictly convex w wzi z ) 0, wqi q ) 0, and Ž wzi z .Ž wqi q .
y Ž wzi q . 2 ) 0x, and that its third derivatives are also zero.
The firm faces an abatement standard s i, which is contained in the open interval
Ž0, e0i .. As is commonly assumed in the literature on enforcement of environmental
policies, the firm operates under an enforcement regime that consists of a probability of an audit p i and a penalty schedule f Ž s i y a i .. The penalty schedule assigns a
fine if and only if the firm is found to be noncompliant Ž a i - s i ., and the penalty
increases at an increasing rate with the level of the violation. Thus, f Ž s i y a i . s 0
if and only if s i F a i, and f 9Ž s i y a i . ) 0 and f 0 Ž s i y a i . ) 0 for s i G a i. Once
again, assume that the third derivative of the penalty schedule is zero. It is also
common to assume that the penalty schedule is determined by a government body
other than the environmental regulator Žfor example, a judiciary or a legislature .,
so that the regulator’s enforcement policy is limited to choosing the probability
with which a firm is to be audited. We shall take the same approach in this paper.5
The firm reacts to the standard, the enforcement policy, and the provision of aid
by choosing a control technology and a level of abatement to minimize its expected
For an extension of this approach, see Garvie and Keeler w6x, who distinguish between the
probability that a firm is audited Žmonitoring. and efforts to punish a violation once it has been detected
Ženforcement..
5

compliance cost; that is, it chooses z i and a i F s i to minimize
C i Ž ai , z i . s ¨ i Ž ai , z i . q w i Ž z i , q . q p i f Ž s i y ai . .

Ž 2.1.

Given our earlier assumptions, it is easy to verify that C i Ž a i, z i . is strictly convex in
the choice variables.6 Assuming interior choices, the following first-order conditions are necessary and sufficient to determine them uniquely:
¨ zi Ž a i , z i . q wzi Ž z i , q . s 0;
¨ ai Ž a i , z i . y p i f 9 Ž s i y a i . F 0,

if - 0, a i s s i .

Ž 2.2.
Ž 2.3.

The regulator in this model is going to combine monitoring and technological aid
to hold each firm to a certain level of compliance; hence, firm i will ultimately be
induced to choose a certain level of abatement. It is therefore convenient to
consider the firm’s abatement-constrained technology choice z i Ž a i, q ., which is
implicitly defined by Ž2.2.. Note that
z ai s y¨ ai zr ¨ zi z q wzi z ) 0;

z qi s ywzi qr ¨ zi z q wzi z ) 0.

Ž 2.4.

As one should expect, the firm chooses a better technology when its abatement is
greater and, holding its abatement fixed, when more aid is provided. Because
¨ i Ž a i, z i . and w i Ž z i, q . have zero third derivatives, z ai and z qi are positive constants.
Now rewrite the Kuhn]Tucker condition Ž2.3. taking z i Ž a i, q . into account:
¨ ai Ž a i , z i Ž a i , q . . y p i f 9 Ž s i y a i . F 0,

if - 0, a i s s i .

Ž 2.5.

Let a i Ž q, s i, p i . be the solution to Ž2.5. when it holds with equality and note that
a i Ž q, s i, p i . F s i. Hence, a i Ž q, s i, p i . is i’s optimal abatement choice when it is
noncompliant or when it is just compliant. From Ž2.5., obtain the following
comparative statics:
a iq Ž q, s i , p i . s y¨ ai z z qi rS ) 0;

Ž 2.6.

a is Ž q, s i , p i . s p i f 0rS g Ž 0, 1 . ;

Ž 2.7.

a ip Ž q, s i , p i . s f 9rS ) 0.

Ž 2.8.

i
In these relations, S s ¨ aa
q ¨ ai z z ai q p i f 0, which can be shown to be positive by
using Ž2.4. and the strict convexity of ¨ i Ž a i, z i .. These comparative statics are what
one should expect: technological aid makes abatement cheaper, so a firm will
increase its abatement with more aid; a higher abatement standard induces it to
increase its abatement, but by less than the decrease in the emissions standard; and
the firm increases its abatement with a higher audit probability.
6

A few notes are appropriate here: First, this formulation of the firm’s expected compliance costs is
nearly identical to that of Amacher and Malik w1x, but it is used for a different purpose. Second, since
the firms’ choices are analyzed in a static framework, we assume a time period that is long enough for
them to make adjustments to their control technologies, but we ignore dynamic considerations such as
the decision about when to adopt a particular technology. Jaffe and Stavins w8x constructed a dynamic
empirical model of technology adoption and compliance. Considering the provision of technological aid
in a dynamic context may be a fruitful exercise for future research.

2.2. Technological Aid and Monitoring
The goal of the environmental authority is to combine technological aid and
enforcement effort to achieve a predetermined level of compliance by each firm in
a cost-effective manner. Rather than treat this as a simultaneous-choice problem,
we break it into parts. Let us first treat technological aid as exogenous and
examine the monitoring effort that is required to reach the regulator’s compliance
goal.
From the regulator’s point of view the abatement standards Ž s 1, s 2 , . . . , s n . are
fixed, but it wants to hold each firm to a level of violation that is no more than a ;
that is, the regulator’s compliance goal is s i y a i Ž q, s i, p i . F a for each i.7 ŽIn
Malik w13x and Amacher and Malik w1x, a s 0.. Recall from Ž2.8. that a i Ž q, s i, p i . is
increasing in p i. Thus, given a fixed level of nonexcludable aid, the regulator’s
compliance goal is met with minimum monitoring effort by p i Ž q, a , s i . i g N,
where for each i,
s i y a i Ž q, s i , p i Ž q, a , s i . . ' a .

Ž 2.9.

Differentiate Ž2.9. with respect to q and rearrange the result to obtain
pqi Ž q, a , s i . s ya iqra ip - 0.

Ž 2.10.

Thus, the burden on direct enforcement activities of maintaining a compliance goal
is lessened with the provision of technological aid. This is precisely the sense in
which technological aid may serve to support direct enforcement efforts in the
maintenance of compliance to environmental standards. This does not imply that
aid should be used for this purpose}we take this issue up in the next section}it
only implies that the opportunity exists.
The underlying reasons for the result that technological aid may substitute for
direct enforcement are quite intuitive. Recall from Ž2.6. that the provision of aid
induces more abatement from a firm w a iq ) 0x. This is due to the fact that it
motivates a firm to adopt a better control technology, which reduces its marginal
abatement costs. The firm’s abatement also responds positively to the probability
that it will be audited w a ip ) 0; see Ž2.8.x. Since aid induces greater abatement from
a firm, to hold its violation to a , the regulator may reduce its monitoring of the
firm as it increases its provision of aid. Clearly, if technological aid is nonexcludable as we assume, its provision allows the regulator to reduce its monitoring of all
firms.8
7
Of course, other regulatory objectives may be considered. For example, we might have assumed that
monitoring is chosen optimally along with technological aid. However, the simultaneous choice of
enforcement and aid does not provide much insight because it turns out that few definitive conclusions
can be drawn about the structure of aggregate compliance costs. Besides, the approach taken here may
be of greater immediate service to policymakers who might be more interested in applying technological
aid to existing regulatory standards and existing enforcement goals rather than the much more difficult
task of optimally and simultaneously determining each aspect of environmental policy.
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From Ž2.9. we may also obtain pai Ž q, a , s i . s y1raip - 0 and psi Ž q, a , s i . s Ž1 y a is .ra ip ) 0, the
signs of which follow from Ž2.7. and Ž2.8.. These indicate that the required monitoring of firm i
increases with a higher compliance goal Ži.e., lower a . and with an increase in the abatement standard.

3. TECHNOLOGICAL AID TO MINIMIZE AGGREGATE
COMPLIANCE COSTS
3.1. Aggregate Compliance Costs and the Optimal Pro¨ ision of Aid
In this section we shall consider the problem of choosing the level of aid that
minimizes the aggregate costs of maintaining the regulator’s enforcement goal. The
aggregate compliance costs include the firms’ emissions-control costs, aggregate
monitoring costs, and the cost of technological aid. The firms’ expected penalties
are not included because we have assumed that there are no costs associated with
collecting penalty payments from the firms and, therefore, we may treat them as
simple transfer payments that have no real effects. Let us consider each component of aggregate compliance costs in turn.
A firm’s emissions-control costs include its abatement costs and technologyadoption costs, which are given by c i Ž a i, z i . s ¨ i Ž a i, z i . q w i Ž z i, q .. Recall that the
firm’s choice of technology is z i Ž a i, q . Žfrom Section 2.1. and that the regulator’s
enforcement policy induces it to choose its abatement so that a i Ž q, s i, p i . s s i y a .
Thus, given that the firm makes optimal choices of abatement and technology, its
emissions-control costs are
ci Ž si y a , q. s ¨ i Ž si y a , z i Ž si y a , q. . q wi Ž z i Ž si y a , q. , q. .

Ž 3.1.

Using Ž2.2., the first-order condition that determines z i Ž a i, q ., the effect on a
firm’s emissions-control costs of a marginal change in technological aid is
c qi Ž s i y a , q . s wqi Ž z i Ž s i y a , q . , q . - 0.

Ž 3.2.

Thus, the effect on a firm’s emissions-control costs of applying technological aid is
simply the reduction of the firm’s technology-adoption costs.
It is also straightforward to show that the firm’s emissions-control costs plus its
expected penalty payment are decreasing in technological aid. Though not surprising, this result is important because it indicates that technological aid can make
pollution control more acceptable to regulated firms.
Although the provision of technological aid reduces each firm’s emissions-control costs, it does so at a diminishing rate. To see this, note from Ž3.2. that
c qi q Ž s i y a , q . s wzi q z qi q wqi q . Upon substitution for z qi from Ž2.4., obtain
2

c qi q Ž s i y a , q . s wqi q wzi z y Ž wqi z . q wqi q¨ zi z r ¨ zi z q wzi z ) 0.

Ž 3.3.

The sign of Ž3.3. follows from the strict convexity of ¨ i Ž a i, z i . and w i Ž z i, q ..
Assuming that the cost of an audit is a constant r, aggregate monitoring costs
are
r

Ý p i Ž q, a , s i . .

Ž 3.4.

igN

From Ž2.10., aggregate monitoring costs are decreasing in the amount of aid
provided. Interestingly, the marginal effectiveness of technological aid as a substitute for monitoring is enhanced as more aid is provided; that is,
pqi q Ž q, a , s i . - 0.

Ž 3.5.

ŽThis result is derived in the Appendix.. As a consequence, aggregate monitoring
costs are strictly conca¨ e in technological aid.
Finally, let us consider the cost of providing nonexcludable aid. Suppose for
simplicity that the marginal cost of providing aid to only one firm is constant at 1.
However, the total cost of providing the same type and level of aid to all firms
depends on the inherent rivalry of the aid instrument. The creation and dissemination of information concerning advanced control techniques may be considered to
be close to perfectly nonrival since the cost of providing the same type and level of
information to another firm is close to zero. On the other hand, direct technical
assistance is a perfectly rival aid instrument since the cost of providing the amount
q to one more firm is simply q. To allow for intermediate degrees of rivalry, let the
total cost of technological aid be Q s Ž1 q f Ž n y 1.. q, where f g w0, 1x. This
specification of the total cost of technological aid indicates that it is a nonexcludable investment with degree of rivalry given by f . Note that since the marginal cost
of providing the same level of nonrival aid to another firm is zero, f s 0 and the
total cost is Q s q. For an aid instrument that is perfectly rival, f s 1 and the
total cost is Q s nq. Intermediate cases are captured by f g Ž0, 1., where lower
values of f indicate less rival aid instruments. Note that Ž1 q f Ž n y 1.. can be
interpreted as the unit price of nonexcludable aid and that less rival instruments
have lower unit prices.
Bringing all the cost components together, the regulator’s choice of aid is q G 0
that minimizes the objective

Ý c i Ž s i y a , q . q r Ý p i Ž q, a , s i . q Ž 1 q f Ž n y 1. . q.
igN

Ž 3.6.

igN

There are at least two potential difficulties with the determination of the optimal
provision of technological aid. Since aggregate emissions-control costs are strictly
convex in q while aggregate monitoring costs are strictly concave, Ž3.6. may be a
rather complicated objective with multiple local optima and boundary solutions.
The second difficulty is a common one: clearly, the information needed to estimate
aggregate compliance costs is extensive and will, at best, be difficult to obtain.
From here on let us assume that Ž3.6. is strictly convex so that its minimizer is
unique. Denote this level of aid as q, and note that it is the solution to the
following Kuhn]Tucker condition:

Ý c qi Ž s i y a , q . q r Ý
igN

pqi Ž q, a , s i . q Ž 1 q f Ž n y 1 . . G 0, if ) 0, q s 0.

igN

Ž 3.7.
The effect on a firm’s emissions-control costs of applying technological aid is
simply the reduction of its technology-adoption costs w c qi s wqi ; see Ž3.2.x. Thus, the
first term of Ž3.7. captures the marginal reduction in the firms’ costs of adopting
control technologies, while the second captures the marginal reduction in aggregate monitoring costs. These two terms represent the marginal benefits of technological aid. The last term is the unit price of nonexcludable aid.
Condition Ž3.7. provides a few immediate conclusions about when technological
aid should be provided to support compliance. Clearly, technological aid is a
profitable public investment if and only if the reduction in aggregate technology-

adoption costs plus the reduction in monitoring costs achieved by the first unit of
aid is greater than the unit price of nonexcludable aid. wThis is true whether or not
Ž3.6. is convex.x In addition, this is more likely to occur when the cost of conducting
an emissions audit is high and when the unit price of aid is low. Thus, the situations
in which direct enforcement is difficult are those in which the provision of
technological aid is more likely to be a beneficial investment. Furthermore, since
less rival aid instruments have lower unit prices, everything else equal, these are
more likely to be profitable investments than rival instruments. Consequently, the
development and dissemination of information about advanced control techniques
is more likely to be a worthwhile investment than direct technical assistance
because the former is less rivalrous.
3.2. Another Sense in Which Technological Aid and Enforcement are Substitutes
Assume that the optimal provision of aid is nonzero. Then Ž3.7. holds with
equality and it implicitly defines the optimal choice of aid q Ž r, f , a , s., where
s s Ž s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n .. Of course, a unique interior choice of aid requires the following convexity condition:
Rs

Ý c qi q q w Ý
igN

pqi q ) 0.

igN

Associated with the optimal choice of aid is the set of audit probabilities,
p i Ž r , f , a , s. s p i Ž q Ž r , f , s. , a , s i . ,

i g N,

Ž 3.8.

and associated with the choice of aid and the enforcement policy are the firms’
choices of control technologies,
z i Ž r , f , a , s. s z i Ž s i y a , q Ž f , r , s. . ,

i g N.

Ž 3.9.

From Ž3.7., obtain qr s yÝ i g N pqi rR ) 0, and from Ž3.8., obtain pri s pqi qr - 0.
These indicate another sense in which technological aid is a substitute for direct
enforcement efforts: when the usual enforcement methods are expensive, an
enforcement authority should rely more heavily on technological aid and less on
direct enforcement. There are two interesting by-products of this relationship.
From Ž3.9. obtain z ri s z qi qr ) 0. wRecall from Ž2.4. that z qi ) 0x. This indicates that
the combination of expensive enforcement and the optimal provision of technological aid leads to the adoption of more effective control technologies. If the pace of
technological advance in pollution control is positively related to the quality of
control technologies in use, the optimal provision of aid when direct enforcement
methods are expensive may serve to promote greater innovation in pollution
control than when enforcement is relatively cheap. In addition, the regulated firms
are better off when enforcement is expensive. This is not because the reduction in
monitoring allows them to cheat more}their violations are held constant by the
regulator’s enforcement policy. Rather, their emissions-control costs are lower
because they receive more aid, and their expected penalty payments are lower as
well because they are audited less frequently.
We should expect the same sorts of comparative statics with respect to a change
in the price of providing nonexcludable aid. Recall that the unit price of nonex-

cludable aid is Ž1 q f Ž n y 1.. and that it increases with more rival aid instruments
Žhigher f .. From Ž3.7. and Ž3.8. obtain qf s yŽ n y 1.rR - 0 and pfi s pqi qf ) 0.
Since a less rival aid instrument has a lower unit cost, the use of such an
instrument calls for greater reliance on technological aid and less on monitoring.
Now, from Ž3.9. obtain zfi s z qi qf - 0: since more aid is provided when a less rival
instrument is employed, the firms adopt more effective control technologies.
3.3. Further Comparati¨ e Static Results
The other comparative static results of this model are concerned with changes in
the compliance goal and the abatement standards. Both types of changes yield
similar results because both have the effect of changing the firms’ abatement
choices.9 It turns out that the regulator’s choice of technological aid is increasing
with a higher compliance target Ži.e., lower a . and with a uniform increase in the
abatement standards that the firms face. However, the effects of these parametric
changes on monitoring is ambiguous because they induce countervailing incentives
for the regulator. Holding the provision of technological aid constant, an increase
in the compliance target and the abatement standards both require more intense
monitoring. On the other hand, however, the increased provision of aid that is
called for in these situations motivates the regulator to reduce its monitoring
effort. The overall effects of a stricter compliance goal and higher abatement
standards on monitoring depend in both cases on the relative magnitudes of these
effects. Finally, there is no ambiguity about the effects of these changes on the
firms’ technology choices. A stricter compliance goal and higher abatement standards motivate the firms to choose more effective control technologies whether the
regulator responds to these changes with more aid or not. The increased provision
of aid that is called for in these situations provides an additional incentive to the
firms to adopt better technologies.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have examined the potential of combining technological aid that reduces
regulated firms’ costs of adopting superior technologies with direct enforcement to
maintain compliance to environmental standards. We have focused on the substitution possibilities between technological aid and enforcement, and found that the
provision of aid can reduce the burden placed on enforcement efforts to maintain a
compliance goal. Furthermore, the provision of aid is more attractive when
monitoring is difficult, and less rival investments like the development and dissemination of information about advanced control techniques are more attractive than
rival investments like direct technical assistance. We have also noted that the
provision of aid reduces the compliance costs of regulated firms and may serve to
quicken the pace of technological advance in pollution control because its application motivates firms to adopt better control technologies.
There are, of course, many ways in which the analysis of this paper can and
should be extended. Future research should examine the same questions posed in
this paper in the context of compliance to incentive-based polices like effluent fees
9
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and marketable permit systems. Future research should also incorporate some
features of the actual problems of monitoring and enforcement that were not
considered in this paper. Monitoring in the United States often relies heavily on
self-reporting by regulated firms. Considering the consequences of providing technological aid when monitoring relies on the firms’ accounts of their own emissions
is likely to be a fruitful exercise.
Models of the sort employed in this paper ignore a feature of monitoring and
enforcement in the United States that has not received adequate attention. A
common form of noncompliance is that, although firms have the necessary equipment installed to meet their emissions standards, the equipment is not maintained
or operated properly. This form of noncompliance results because authorities often
audit firms to check if they have sufficient control equipment installed Žthis is
called monitoring for initial compliance., but are not very diligent about monitoring actual emissions Žmonitoring for continuous compliance.. ŽThis feature of
monitoring and enforcement in the United States is discussed in Russell w15x..
Typical models in the literature consider only monitoring of emissions: they do not
include an initial audit by an authority to check if the technology a firm has
installed is sufficient to meet its abatement standard. Hence, firms in these models
have no incentive to install a piece of control equipment and then fail to operate it
properly. The combination of monitoring for initial compliance and monitoring for
continuous compliance appears not to have received much attention. Considering
the application of technological aid in these contexts would help fill this gap in the
existing literature as well as further the examination of the potential of publicly
provided technological aid.
APPENDIX
To derive pqi q Ž q, a , s i . - 0, first recall from Ž2.10. that
yaiq Ž q, s i, p i .ra ip Ž q, s i, p i .. Then,
2

pqi Ž q, a , s i . s

pqi q Ž q, a , s i . s y w A y B x r Ž a ip . ,

Ž A.1.

A s Ž a iq q q a iq p pqi . a ip

Ž A.2.

B s Ž a ip q q a ip p pqi . a iq .

Ž A.3.

where
and

i
Recall from Ž2.6. that a iq Ž q, s i, p i . s y¨ ai z z qi rS, where S s ¨ aa
q ¨ ai z z ai q p i f 0 ) 0.
iŽ i
i.
i
Also recall that ¨ a , z has zero third derivatives and that z a and z qi are positive
constants. Therefore,

a iq q Ž q, s i , p i . s ¨ ai z z qi Ž pqi f 0 . rS 2 s ya iq pqi f 0rS ,

Ž A.4.

a iq p Ž q, s i , p i . s ¨ ai z z qi Ž f 0 . rS 2 s ya iq f 0rS .

Ž A.5.

Upon substitution for a iq q and a iq p in ŽA.2., we have A s y2 f 0 pqi a iq a iprS. Since
pqi s yaiqra ip ,
2

A s 2 f 0 Ž a iq . rS.

Ž A.6.

Now, from Ž2.8., a ip Ž q, s i, p i . s f 9Ž s i y a i Ž q, s i, p i ..rS. Then,
a ip p Ž q, s i , p i . s Ž yf 0 a ip S y f 0 f 9 . rS 2 s y2 f 0 a iprS.

Ž A.7.

Upon substitution for a iq p and a ip p in ŽA.3. and applying pqi s ya iqra ip ,
2

B s f 0 Ž a iq . rS.

Ž A.8.

Substituting ŽA.8. and ŽA.6. into ŽA.1. yields pqi q Ž q, a , s i . s yf 0 Ž a iq . 2rŽ a ip . 2 S,
which is negative because both f 0 and S are positive.
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